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INTRODUCTION 
For major financial trading firms, the money is not really in the stocks 
they trade; it is in the methods they have developed to trade them.  In 2008, 
financial firms generated an estimated $21 billion in profits from high-
frequency trading (HFT).1  HFT utilizes computers, operating under the 
control of complex algorithms, to mine dozens of marketplaces for 
information, while simultaneously executing purchase and sale orders.2  
These computers are able to spot trends, analyze information, and place 
millions of orders in fractions of a second, giving them a distinct advantage 
over human traders and slower computers.3  The algorithms that control the 
computers are the geese that lay many of Wall Street’s golden eggs, and 
their development and confidentiality are vital to the success of HFT firms.4 
One of the biggest firms using HFT is Goldman Sachs.5  Goldman 
understands the value of its algorithms, richly compensating the employees 
who develop them.  In 2009, Sergey Aleynikov was programming HFT 
code for Goldman and making $400,000 a year.6  In return, Aleynikov 
agreed to Goldman’s confidentiality policy that made clear that his work 
was the intellectual property of the firm, required him to keep all 
proprietary information in confidence, and barred him from taking any 
information or using it when his employment ended.7 
In April 2009, a start-up firm called Teza Technologies was attempting 
to develop its own HFT system and offered Aleynikov more than $1 million 
per year to develop part of its algorithm.8  Teza let Aleynikov know that it 
was expecting the system to be developed far faster than usual.9  Aleynikov 
accepted Teza’s offer and set his last day at Goldman for June 5, 2009.10  In 
a scene reminiscent of spy capers, at 5:20 p.m. that day—just before his 
going away party—Aleynikov went to his office, secretly encrypted more 
than 500,000 lines of Goldman’s HFT source code, and uploaded the code 
to a foreign server.11  He then deleted the encryption program and tried to 
 
1 Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, In Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
2009, at A1. 




6 United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2012). 
7 See United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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erase the history of his computer commands.12  Later that evening, he 
downloaded the source code to his home computer and copied some of the 
files to other computers.13  On July 2, Aleynikov flew to Chicago to attend 
meetings at Teza and brought a flash drive and laptop containing portions 
of Goldman’s HFT code.14 
Aleynikov was arrested by federal agents when he arrived home from 
those meetings.15  He was charged with one count each of violating the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA), and the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).16  The district court 
dismissed the CFAA count before trial, but Aleynikov was ultimately tried 
and convicted under the EEA and the NSPA counts.17  However, on April 
11, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
overturned both convictions on Aleynikov’s appeal.18 
The NSPA makes it a crime to “transport[ ], transmit[ ], or transfer[ ] 
in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities 
or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”19  The question before the Second 
Circuit regarding the NSPA was whether the algorithm constituted a “good, 
ware, or merchandise.”20  Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the code did not qualify because “[s]ome tangible 
property must be taken from the owner for there to be deemed a ‘good’ that 
is ‘stolen’ for purposes of the NSPA.”21  Since the HFT code was intangible 
property, the court reversed Aleynikov’s NSPA conviction.22 
The EEA conviction appeal also centered on the nature of the HFT 
code.  Here, the Second Circuit asked whether the HFT code was either 
“produced for” or “placed in” commerce.23  The district court had ruled that 
the HFT code was “produced for” commerce because Goldman used it to 
execute trades.24  The Second Circuit ruled that because Goldman had no 






16 Id. at 74–75. 
17 Id. at 75. 
18 Id. 
19 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012). 
20 See Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 76. 
21 Id. at 77. 
22 Id. at 78–79. 
23 Id. at 79. 
24 United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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itself was not a product produced for commerce.25  Indeed, the court noted 
that Goldman went to “great lengths” to maintain the code’s secrecy, as 
Goldman’s profits “depended on no one else having” the code. 26  Thus, the 
very attribute that made the theft damaging to Goldman—that the value of 
the source code depended on confidentiality—meant that Aleynikov’s theft 
was not a violation of the EEA. 
HFT systems are valuable because they confer traders an advantage 
over competitors who are not using them.27  If another firm can gather the 
same information and make the same trades at the same frequency, the 
value of Goldman’s system is reduced.  Such loss is the reason why 
prosecutors tried to fit three different statutes to Aleynikov’s actions.  The 
EEA and NSPA counts’ failures illustrate a point that underlies this 
Comment: traditional statutory regimes are, at times, inadequate to address 
certain criminal acts presented in the digital age. 
This Comment argues that Aleynikov’s theft should constitute a 
violation of federal law, but not the NSPA or EEA.  Rather, this Comment 
focuses on the third statute Aleynikov was originally charged with 
violating, one specifically enacted to address digital age crimes: the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).  In dismissing the CFAA count, 
the district court looked to persuasive authority that held that the CFAA is 
only violated when computer users access information that they do not have 
permission to access for any purpose.28  Such precedent represents a CFAA 
narrow interpretation, which developed in response to other cases that 
applied a broad interpretation.29  Those cases held that the CFAA implicitly 
contained use restrictions, meaning that improper information use could 
violate the statute.30  The narrow interpretation adopted in the Aleynikov 
 
25 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 82. 
26 Id. 
27 See Duhigg, supra note 1. 
28 See Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 
F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2009); Univ. Sports Pub. Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. 
Supp. 2d 378, 382–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 
F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jet One Grp., Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., No. 
08-CV-3980 (JS) (ETB), 2009 WL 2524864, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009)). 
29 For circuits that have followed the broad interpretation, see United States v. John, 597 
F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th 
Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001); 
see also infra Part III.A & B. 
30 See, e.g., Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21; EF Cultural, 274 F.3d at 582; NCMIC Fin. Corp. 
v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1056 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. 
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
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trial court criticized these “broad interpretation” or “use restrictions” 
approaches as overly broad with little textual grounding.31 
Those criticisms have merit, but the narrow interpretation adopted in 
Aleynikov is also flawed.  It renders the CFAA ineffective when employees 
misappropriate data.  This Comment advances a novel interpretation of the 
CFAA, which would impose liability for employee data theft while 
avoiding the pitfalls of overbreadth that plague the current broad 
interpretations. 
  Part I of this Comment gives a brief background of computer crime, 
computer misuse statutes, and the CFAA.  Part II discusses CFAA 
provisions that are relevant to employee data theft.  Part III provides a 
summary of the current circuit split regarding insider theft under the CFAA, 
the split between the narrow and broad interpretation theories.  Part IV 
argues that insider theft should be prohibited by federal law generally and 
the CFAA specifically, but acknowledges the validity of critiques of the 
CFAA’s current broad interpretation.  Finally, Part V advances a new 
CFAA interpretation that brings insider data theft within the scope of the 
statute, while eliminating concerns about overbreadth. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF DIGITAL THEFT 
A. A RISING PROBLEM 
It is a truism that computer technology occupies a central place in 
modern business.  It is not just digital communication that is pervasive; 
businesses have largely discarded paper and boxes for hard drives and 
servers as the preferred means of storing information.  And with the advent 
of mobile devices (flash drives, laptops, smart phones, etc.) employees can 
access and transmit electronic data with ease.  Given the concurrent 
dependence on digital storage and ease in digital transmission, it may be no 
surprise that data theft is a rising problem for businesses.32  In fact, many 
data thieves are in positions similar to Sergey Aleynikov: members of a 
company’s management with the ability to take electronic files as they 
prepare to leave the company (or even after they have left).33 
A study conducted by accounting and consulting firm KPMG showed 
that between 2006 and 2008, cases of employee-related data theft more than 
 
31 Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 193–94. 
32 See Pamela Taylor, Comment, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 205–06 (2012). 
33 See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Electronic Data Theft More Prevalent than Physical Thefts: 
Survey, EWEEK (Oct. 18, 2010), http://goo.gl/IjaeGr. 
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doubled.34  In roughly 70% of those thefts, the employees moved to a rival 
company, and a substantial number of thieves used stolen data to start 
competing businesses themselves.35  The KPMG study predicted that the 
number of such insider thefts was “almost certain” to increase further,36 and 
a 2010 report on trends in international fraud validated that prediction.37  In 
that survey, businesses reported that electronic data thefts outnumbered 
tangible property thefts and that financial losses from data theft were 
greater than losses from physical thefts of cash, assets, and inventory.38 
The firms most threatened by the rise in data theft are those in 
“information-rich industries” such as financial services, professional 
services, technology, and communications.39  These industries both depend 
most on proprietary information and are plagued by the highest levels of 
electronic theft.  Damage from data theft is not limited to the monetary 
value of the information; there is a “risk of reputational damage if your firm 
loses customer data.  That itself could be an existential threat to your 
business.”40  Disturbingly, firms are not well protected against such threats, 
as surveys of employees show many believe that digital theft is common 
and can be committed with relative impunity.41 
B. COMPUTER MISUSE STATUTES AS POTENTIAL REMEDIES 
The rise of computer-related crimes was not unanticipated.  Starting in 
the late 1970s, states enacted legislation to combat computer misuse that 
was not effectively addressed by preexisting law.42  Abuses such as 
hacking, distribution of deleterious programming code, denial-of-service 
attacks, and theft of digital information were not adequately covered by 
existing law.  Trespass and burglary laws, for example, were generally too 
tied to the physical world, while theft laws were too dependent on true 
owners being deprived of their property interest.43 
 
34 Leslie Paul Machado, Protecting Against Employee Theft, HUMAN RES. EXEC. ONLINE 
(July 12, 2010), http://goo.gl/Nh53zc (citing a 2009 KPMG study). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Rashid, supra note 33. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (quoting Tommy Helsby, Kroll chairman for Europe, Middle East, and Africa). 
41 See Taylor, supra note 32, at 206. 
42 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in 
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1602–15 (2003); see also Katherine 
Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ Authorization 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 835–36 (2009) (citing 
Kerr, supra, at 1602–07). 
43 Field, supra note 42, at 835 n.102, 835–36. 
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As one commenter described it, “[c]omputer-related criminal conduct 
presents a challenge . . . because it involves electronic impulses that cannot 
be seen, touched, moved, or copied as those terms have traditionally been 
defined, and that therefore seem to fall outside the idea of ‘property’ as 
defined over centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”44  This is 
because “[l]arceny and theft statutes typically require proof that the 
defendant exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with 
the intent to deprive the other of all or part of its value.”45 
This problem manifested itself in the case of Lund v. Commonwealth, 
in which the Virginia Supreme Court held that unauthorized use of a 
computer could not be prosecuted under a larceny statute.46  Specifically, 
the court held that “[a]t common law, larceny is the taking and carrying 
away of the goods and chattels of another with intent to deprive the owner 
of the possession thereof permanently.”47  Because the computer owner was 
not deprived of possession, the larceny statute was inapplicable.48  The 
Aleynikov case provides a more recent example of this dilemma, with the 
Second Circuit holding the NSPA inapplicable to intangible property, such 
as the stolen source code.49 
But states were not alone in enacting computer misuse laws.  The U.S. 
Congress also enacted a new, specific computer crime statute.  The CFAA50 
was Congress’s first federal computer crime law.51  Enacted in 1984, 
Congress updated it in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2008.52  
II. THE CFAA STATUTE 
The CFAA section most relevant to employee theft of digital 
information is 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), which holds as criminally liable 
those who “intentionally access[] a computer without authorization or 
exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] . . . information from any 
 
44 Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl><Alt><Del>: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime 
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 577 (1997). 
45 Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 BUS. 
LAW. 1395, 1400 (2007). 
46 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (Va. 1977). 
47 Id. 
48 See id. 
49 See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2012). 
50 See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1598 n.11 (explaining that the name “Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act” technically refers only to the 1986 amendments to the statute, but that in practice 
both courts and commentators use the name and its acronym for the entire statute). 
51 Id. at 1615. 
52 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); Kerr, supra note 42, at 1615.  
612 KEVIN JAKOPCHEK [Vol. 104 
protected computer.”53  Violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) is a misdemeanor 
unless it is committed “for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain,”54 in furtherance of any “criminal or tortious act,”55 or if the 
value of information obtained is greater than $5,000.56 
Also relevant is § 1030(g), which creates a civil remedy for some 
victims of CFAA violations.57  Consequently, much of the case law 
regarding § 1030(a)(2)(C) interpretation has occurred in civil cases.  
Subsequent criminal cases have not distinguished between statutory CFAA 
interpretations in criminal and civil contexts.58  Thus, this Comment relies 
on both civil and criminal CFAA cases’ interpretive developments. 
The statute also defines a number of terms, and two definitions are 
particularly pertinent.  “Protected computer” is defined as a computer 
“which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication, including a computer located outside the United States that 
is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication of the United States.”59  That broad definition means that 
“protected computer” effectively encompasses any computer connected to 
the Internet.60 
The second term, and the most significant one for this Comment, is the 
phrase “exceeds authorized access,” which the statute defines as “to access 
a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter.”61  This provision applies to “insider” situations, such as employee 
data theft. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING CFAA’S REACH 
In deciding cases of employee digital theft, courts have focused on the 
word “authorized” in “exceeded authorized access.”62  Two main 
 
53 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
54 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i). 
55 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
56 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii). 
57 Id. § 1030(g). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing as 
authoritative the CFAA interpretations from the civil case LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 
581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
59 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
60 See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1663. 
61 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6). 
62 See, e.g., Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129 (“We affirm.  Because [Christopher] Brekka was 
authorized to use LVRC’s computers while he was employed at LVRC, he did not access a 
computer ‘without authorization’ . . . .”); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 
1042, 1056 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“The issue for the Court to decide is whether an employee 
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interpretation branches of that word have emerged: broad interpretation, 
which has led to findings of liability, and narrow interpretation, which has 
led to employees being held not liable in civil cases or not guilty in criminal 
cases.63  The broad interpretations impose restrictions on how insiders use 
information,64 while the narrow theory ignores use and focuses solely on 
whether the insider has permission to view data. 
Two main theories have emerged to justify a broad interpretation: 
agency theory and contract theory.65  Instead of defining “authorized 
access” by whether someone has permission to access information, these 
theories look to their duties and responsibilities relating to access.  Courts 
derive these duties from other legal principles, namely the law of agency 
and contract.66 
A. BROAD INTERPRETATION THROUGH AGENCY THEORY 
The agency approach asserts that in the employer–employee context, 
“authorized access” is governed by the same law that governs the 
employer–employee relationship: the law of agency.67  The theory 
specifically focuses on the duty of loyalty that employees owe employers.68  
That duty requires employees to act solely for the benefit of their employer 
and, most relevantly, means that an employee’s authority to act for the 
employer is terminated when “without knowledge of the principal, he 
acquires adverse interests or is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of 
 
may act ‘without authorization’ or ‘exceeds authorized access’ when he accesses 
confidential and proprietary business information . . . that he has permission to access, but 
then uses that information in a manner inconsistent with the employer’s interest or in 
violation of other contractual obligations . . . .”). 
63 Compare Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(imposing liability when an employee used information that he otherwise had permission to 
access for work purposes), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129 (refusing to impose liability when 
an employee used information that he otherwise had permission to access for work 
purposes).  
64 See, e.g., Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 
577, 582 (1st Cir. 2001) (imposing liability when an employee provided confidential 
information to a competitor); Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1058–59 (imposing liability when a 
company vice president accessed the company’s customer list and e-mailed it to himself for 
use in future competition). 
65 See Field, supra note 42, at 822–23. 
66 See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21 (evaluating authority using principles of agency law); 
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582 (evaluating authority through the lens of contract law using a 
confidentiality agreement). 
67 See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1633–34. 
68 Id. 
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loyalty to the principal.”69  In the employer–employee context, the duty of 
loyalty is breached at the moment the employee resolves to compete with or 
otherwise harm the employer.70  In the context of the CFAA, then, this 
theory means that authorization to access any information is implicitly 
revoked by the employee’s breach of the duty of loyalty.71  Consequently, 
even if an employee has permission to access information for work 
purposes, he still violates the CFAA by accessing such information with an 
intent that violates the duty of loyalty. 
The Seventh Circuit adopted this interpretation in International 
Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.72  In that case, an employee deleted all of 
the data on one of his employer’s laptops.73  The employee had permission 
to access the computer and the specific data for work purposes.74  The court 
held that when the employee resolved to destroy the files, however, he 
breached his duty of loyalty, which implicitly revoked his permission to 
access the data.75  The CFAA claim against him therefore survived a motion 
to dismiss.76  In a different case, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Washington held that defendants stated a sufficient CFAA claim 
against an employee who e-mailed confidential information to a competitor 
when he was preparing to jump ship.77  The employee had allegedly 
breached his duty of loyalty and therefore would be unauthorized to access 
the information.78 
The agency approach’s broad scope means it can be said to be the most 
employer-friendly approach, as simply acquiring interests adverse to the 
employer can revoke authorization and result in liability.79  Accordingly, 
 
69 See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (quoting State v. DiGiulio, 835 P.2d 488, 492 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)). 
70 See id. at 420–21 (holding that authority to access information ends when an employee 
acquires adverse interests). 
71 See Field, supra note 42, at 823.(citing Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self 
Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000)). 
72 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21. 
73 Id. at 419. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 420 (“For his authorization to access the laptop terminated when . . . he resolved 
to destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that were also the property of his 
employer, in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an employee.”). 
76 See id. at 420–21. 
77 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 
1123, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
78 Id. at 1125 (“[T]he authority of the plaintiff’s former employees ended when they 
allegedly became agents of the defendant.”). 
79 See Field, supra note 42, at 824 (calling the agency theory “undoubtedly the most 
employer-favorable approach, since simply characterizing the employee’s actions as against 
the employer’s interests will likely result in liability”). 
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this theory ensures that virtually any fact pattern involving “insider” digital 
theft results in liability under the CFAA.80 
B. BROAD INTERPRETATION THROUGH CONTRACT THEORY 
Other courts have looked to the law of contracts to define the scope of 
“authorization” under the CFAA.  This approach looks at explicit terms of 
employment (e.g., employment agreements, employee handbooks, 
published policies) to define what access is authorized.81  In one case 
applying contract theory, EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica Inc., former 
employees provided information to their former employer’s competitor.82  
The First Circuit looked to those employees’ employment contracts and 
determined that their disclosure likely violated a confidentiality provision 
therein.83  Because the contract governed the scope of the authorization to 
access information, the First Circuit reasoned that if the defendant’s 
allegations were proven, the employees violated the agreement and 
exceeded authorization, making them potentially liable under the CFAA.84 
In United States v. Czubinski, the First Circuit employed similar 
reasoning by examining an employee handbook signed by an IRS 
employee.85  The handbook rules of conduct limited computer access to 
“only those accounts required to accomplish . . . official duties.”86  The 
court determined that the IRS employee exceeded his authorized access 
under the CFAA when he browsed acquaintances’ tax returns, even if the 
defendant did not obtain anything “of value” to sustain a conviction under 
the specific subpart.87 
This contract-based approach has the advantage of expressly 
delineating what access is or is not permitted for each individual.  It also 
allows some flexibility, as prohibited conduct adjusts to the terms of the 
contract, and employers can adjust for more or less leeway for their 
employees’ access to information depending on the sensitivity of 
information or other considerations. 
 
80 Kerr, supra note 42, at 1634 (declaring that “the apparent effect of Shurgard is to 
criminalize an employee’s use of an employer’s computer for anything other than work-
related activities”). 
81 Field, supra note 42, at 827 (“The contract-based interpretation requires the computer 
user to violate a contract before that user’s access can be found to be unauthorized.”). 
82 274 F.3d 577, 579–80 (1st Cir. 2001). 
83 Id. at 583–84. 
84 Id. at 583. 
85 See 106 F.3d 1069, 1071 (1st Cir. 1997). 
86 Id. at 1071 n.1. 
87 See id. at 1078 (reversing Richard Czubinksi’s conviction but finding that he 
“unquestionably exceeded authorized access to a Federal interest computer”). 
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C. NARROW INTERPRETATION 
The narrow interpretation of the CFAA arose as a response to the 
broad theories.  Courts were worried that those theories rely heavily on 
principles extrinsic to the statute, conflate statutory terms, and could 
encompass acts that Congress did not intend the CFAA to address.88  
Because of those worries, courts developed the narrow theory, claiming that 
it focused on a plain language reading of the statute and the word 
“authorized.”89 
The first court to develop such a theory was the Ninth Circuit in LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka.90  In Brekka, an employer sued its former 
employee under the CFAA after the employee e-mailed data to himself and 
then used that data to compete with his former employer.91  The district 
court had held that because the employee had permission to access the 
information, he could not be liable under the CFAA, and the appellate court 
upheld the district court’s narrow reading of the statute.92  Brekka stressed 
that the term “authorization” has no technical or ambiguous meaning, and 
that the dictionary definition should govern.93  The Ninth Circuit looked to 
the plain language in reducing the question to whether an employer gave the 
employee permission to access specific information and, if access had been 
granted, no violation could occur.94  Thus, if a person was granted access to 
a customer list for a specific purpose, for instance, he could not be 
prosecuted under the CFAA for any action taken regarding that customer 
list, regardless of the action. 
Under this interpretation, courts do not analyze use (or misuse), but 
rather only ask whether the employee was allowed to access the information 
in the course of employment.95  This inquiry limits the application of 
“exceeding authorized access” only to those situations where an employee 
has authorization to access a computer but then “hacks” into information he 
 
88 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (discussing 
“innocuous” acts that broad CFAA interpretations would criminalize).  
89 See, e.g., id. at 863; LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
90 Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127. 
91 See id. at 112930. 
92 See id. at 1132, 1137. 
93 Id. at 1133 (citing RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2001) and adopting 
its definition of “authorization” as persuasive in defining “exceeds authorized access”) 
94 See id. 
95 See Field, supra note 42, at 825 (explaining that “where an employee has been 
affirmatively granted the ability to use and access a computer database or system, his 
authorization cannot be challenged under the code-based interpretation”). 
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does not have permission to access.96  For example, an employee might use 
the computer he is allowed to use to access an encrypted file on the 
employer network that he is not allowed to access.97 
This narrow type of analysis is also exemplified in the criminal case 
United States v. Nosal.98  In Nosal, a former employee who had set up a 
competing company convinced some of his former colleagues to use their 
access to obtain data from a confidential database.99  The district court 
originally held Nosal liable under the CFAA by applying a broad 
interpretation.100  After Brekka, Nosal moved for, and was granted, 
reconsideration of its motion to dismiss.101  The district court then granted 
dismissal, as Brekka explicitly rejected the broad-interpretation reasoning 
that supported the court’s original denial.102  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.103  The former colleagues, as current employees, were allowed by 
their employer to access the information as part of their jobs.104  According 
to the court, because the current employees were allowed to access the 
information, the CFAA did not make them liable for sending Nosal the 
data.105 
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ FLAWED APPROACHES  
For a variety of reasons, the CFAA should be interpreted as extending 
liability to insider theft of digital information.  Policy justifications, in the 
form of the rising danger of digital theft, privacy concerns, and the nature of 
the Internet, support the need for a federal statute criminalizing insider 
digital information theft.  Further, the CFAA’s history indicates that it was 
indeed intended to extend liability to such crimes.  Finally, the statutory 
 
96 See id. 
97 Kerr, supra note 42, at 1604 (“For example, a person can hack into a corporate 
network and see secret files that the person is not supposed to view.  In such a case, the 
hacker will have exceeded her privileges on the network; she will see more than the network 
was configured to allow her to view.”). 
98 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
99 Id. at 856. 
100 See United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 13, 2009). 
101 See United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 
2010). 
102 See id. at *5–6.  
103 Nosal, 676 F.3d 863. 
104 Id. at 864. 
105 Id. at 863 (“For our part, we continue to follow in the path blazed by Brekka and the 
growing number of courts that have reached the same conclusion.  These courts recognize 
that the plain language of the CFAA ‘target[s] the unauthorized procurement or alteration of 
information, not its misuse or misappropriation.’” (citations omitted)). 
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language itself, particularly the express statutory definition of “exceeds 
authorized access” supports liability and cannot be construed consistently 
with the narrow interpretations.  However, the current forms of the broad 
interpretations are also unworkable due to the overbreadth of what they 
criminalize.  Thus, this Comment advances a third theory, consistent with 
congressional intent, which would criminalize insider data theft without the 
overreach of the current broad interpretations. 
A. POLICY CONCERNS JUSTIFY A FEDERAL PROHIBITION ON INSIDER 
DIGITAL INFORMATION THEFT 
Three policy concerns support extending liability to insider digital 
information theft through a federal law.  First, the growing harms of digital 
theft warrant additional protection.  Second, such liability will help to 
protect the privacy interests of third parties whose concerns may not be 
adequately internalized by the companies that possess their data.  Third, the 
federal government is better situated to police digital theft than the states. 
As discussed, digital theft is a present and growing problem for 
businesses, now costing companies more than theft of physical objects.106  
Further, the ease of transmitting digital information leaves employees with 
a sense of invulnerability when it comes to committing digital theft.107  The 
CFAA’s dual criminal and civil nature provides the deterrent effect 
traditionally associated with criminal prohibition, and the civil provisions 
allow businesses the opportunity to seek restitution.  Indeed, the significant 
dangers presented by digital theft have influenced judicial decisions in both 
Australia and England to extend laws against unauthorized access to also 
proscribe access for unauthorized purposes.108 
Another policy rationale is that criminalization of digital theft protects 
third-party privacy.109  Third parties, such as customers and clients, may 
provide firms with personal information that those firms use in the course 
of business for tasks, such as marketing.  Many of the privacy-related 
concerns may not be sufficiently internalized to firms and their data security 
policies and procedures.110  That is to say, those who bear the social costs of 
privacy breaches, the data subjects, do not have control over the security 
 
106 See supra note 34–38 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Gov’t of the United 
States, [2000] 2 UKHL 216 (interpreting U.K. Computer Misuse Act similarly); DPP (Vic) v 
Murdoch, [1993] 1 VR 406, 40911 (Austl.) (interpreting State of Victoria Computer 
Trespass Act to apply to a bank employee). 
109 Winn, supra note 45, at 1420–22 (explaining that criminalization would protect third-
party privacy in a discussion of the pros and cons of a criminalization scheme). 
110 Id. at 1420. 
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measures adopted by those who aggregate the data.  In these instances, 
criminalization may provide a deterrent effect to protect third-party privacy 
that would otherwise be absent in a scheme that only provided for civil 
recourse or no recourse at all. 
One instance in which the CFAA served this purpose was the case 
United States v. Rodriguez.111  In that case, a Social Security Administration 
(SSA) agent used the SSA database to obtain information about female 
acquaintances, including his ex-wife, his former girlfriend, his former 
colleague’s daughter, and a waitress who worked at a restaurant he 
frequently visited, among others.112  The SSA had a computer-use policy, 
reinforced through training, which instructed employees that access to 
database information was only allowed for legitimate business purposes.113  
Even though Roberto Rodriguez refused to sign annual forms 
acknowledging that he received the polices in writing,114 the court noted 
that the SSA still told Rodriguez he was not authorized “to obtain personal 
information for nonbusiness reasons.”115  Applying contract theory, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that Rodriguez had exceeded his authorized access 
when he perused the information for personal gain and was guilty of a 
CFAA violation.116 
A second rationale for federal criminal liability is that the nature of 
digital theft requires regulation by federal authorities, as opposed to 
regulation by states.  One issue relates to jurisdiction.  Consider, for 
instance, a hypothetical situation involving an employee who works in 
California for a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place 
of business in New York.  The employee downloads information stored on 
servers in Illinois, and then uploads that information to a competitor based 
in Florida.  Which state’s digital theft law shall apply?  The application of 
federal law not only eliminates complex jurisdictional and choice-of-law 
questions for the courts; it also provides clearer guidance for citizens 
regarding prohibited conduct.  Second, coupling the geographically 
dispersed nature of computer crime and the fact that one goal of the CFAA 
it to provide a civil recourse, a national statute would facilitate plaintiffs’ 
pursuit of remedies.  Finally, given the possibility of such diffuse 
 
111 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Andrew T. Hernacki, Note, A Vague Law in 
a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543, 155657 (2012) (discussing Rodriguez’s 
application to theft of third-party information). 
112 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260–62. 
113 Id. at 1260. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1263. 
116 See id. at 1263–64. 
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geographic scope and the technological complexity of computer crime, 
federal investigators—with national reach and superior resources—may be 
better suited for such enforcement than local authorities.   
Indeed, Orin Kerr, a leading advocate of a narrow CFAA 
interpretation, notes the potential value of a federal law criminalizing 
insider digital theft.117  Referring to cases of insider liability, Kerr wrote: “I 
don’t think these facts should fit under 18 U.S.C. 1030 because they deal 
with a different kind of problem; it’s hard to fit them in to 1030 without 
causing incredibly broad liability.  But I do think it’s fair to want to 
criminalize such conduct with a different statute.”118  Kerr even went so far 
as to draft his own potential statute to criminalize insider digital theft,119 and 
he defended his draft by arguing that it was “necessary” because courts 
have held, as they did in Aleynikov, that the NSPA does not cover digital 
information.120  That one of the leading advocates for a narrow CFAA 
interpretation thinks that some law criminalizing insider digital theft is 
“necessary” demonstrates the strength of the policy arguments in favor of 
criminalizing that conduct.  But in Part V, this Comment shows that an 
entirely new statute is unnecessary to counter Kerr’s fears of CFAA 
overbreadth.  I advocate for a novel CFAA interpretation that focuses on the 
word “obtain” in the definition of “exceed authorized access.”  This 
interpretation shows that the CFAA, as written, can achieve necessary, but 
limited, insider theft liability. 
B. CFAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS IT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED 
TO CRIMINALIZE INSIDER DIGITAL121 
The CFAA’s Congressional Reports make clear that one of Congress’s 
central purposes in enacting the CFAA was to protect against information 
misappropriation.  Indeed, while advocates of a narrow interpretation 
maintain that the statute is concerned only with access, not misuse, the 
entire history of the statute indicates that it was largely driven to combat a 
 
117 Orin Kerr, What About the Insiders? A Second Proposal to Change the Computer 
Crime Statutes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://goo.gl/3fHUCN. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.; Orin S. Kerr, 18 U.S.C. 1031, Employee Misuse of Computer Information: 
January 22, 2013 Draft, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://goo.gl/ALvt0m (last visited June 
2, 2014). 
120 Kerr, supra note 117. 
121 The 2001 and 2008 amendments do not affect the construction of 1030(a)(2) and are 
not discussed here.  For a discussion of the effect of those amendments, see Taylor, supra 
note 32, at 20708. 
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specific misuse: theft.122 CFAA amendments and their corresponding 
reports also indicate that Congress intended to expand the Act to cover 
insider theft, and that the scope of insider “authorization” is indeed affected 
by the purpose of authorization.123 
The first version of the CFAA, passed in 1984, was primarily aimed at 
“protecting classified information on government computers, as well as 
protecting financial records and credit information on government and 
financial institution computers.”124  While the computers and information 
covered under the CFAA were originally limited, one purpose, even in the 
initial bill, was to prevent electronic data theft.  A 1984 House Report states 
that the proposed legislation was necessary because “[i]t is obvious that 
traditional theft/larceny statutes are not the proper vehicles to control the 
spate of computer abuse and computer-assisted crimes.”125  As one court 
stated, the reason that such statutes were not proper vehicles was because 
“they generally do not define property to include electronically processed or 
stored data.”126  This was the exact concern discussed previously in Part II. 
The 1986 amendments expanded the Act to provide liability for other 
forms of fraud and related activities in connection with access to devices 
and computers.127  Congress, however, specifically limited such 
prohibitions to “Federal interest computers.”128  As the committee 
explained, the goal was “to limit Federal jurisdiction over computer crime 
to those cases in which there is a compelling Federal interest, i.e., where 
computers of the Federal Government or certain financial institutions are 
involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in nature.”129  With the 
Internet’s advent and expansion, this jurisdictional limitation disappeared as 
“almost all computer use has become interstate in nature.”130 
While the Act was then limited to such “Federal interest”131 
computers, the Senate Reports reveal that the 1986 amendments were 
intended to expand the actions covered to allow prosecutors to fit the 
 
122 See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996) (explaining that the legislative intent behind the 
passage of the CFAA includes addressing “the problem of computer crime”); see also note 
139 and accompanying text. 
123 See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
124 Mark D. Weller & Ronald J. Shaffer, Making a Federal Case Out of Employee Theft 
of Trade Secrets, 26 ACC DOCKET 96, 98 (2008). 
125 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 9 (1984). 
126 Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tenn. 2008). 
127 See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1629–30. 
128 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10. 
129 Id. at 4. 
130 Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 
1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
131 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10. 
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“square peg of computer fraud into the round hole of theft, embezzlement 
or even the illegal conversion of trade secrets.”132 
The 1986 amendments also added the key phrase in insider theft 
situations“exceeds authorized access”which one commentator has 
argued was added to “remedy the misuse-of-legitimate-access problem” in 
that the 1984 Act “did not cover individuals who caused harm with 
authorized access.”133  In presenting the “exceeds authorized access” 
language for a full vote, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that it 
did not intend to extend liability “to any type or form of computer access 
that is for a legitimate business purpose.  Thus, any access for a legitimate 
purpose that is pursuant to an express or implied authorization would not be 
affected.”134  This is the most important language from the 1986 House 
Report. 
The Report does not say that “any access that is pursuant to an express 
or implied authorization would not be affected” but rather “any access for a 
legitimate purpose that is pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
would not be affected.”135  This discussion of the addition of the “exceeds 
authorized access” provision demonstrates Congress’s intent to address the 
purpose and use of information access by insiders, those who could have a 
legitimate purpose for accessing the information, and not simply the access 
itself. 
The 1996 amendments further broadened the reach of the statute.  
Those amendments, among other changes, substituted the phrase “protected 
computer” for “federal interest computer.”136  The Senate Report stated the 
1996 amendments’ purpose was to broaden the CFAA to “ensure that the 
theft of intangible information . . . is prohibited in the same way theft of 
physical items are protected.”137  As courts have recognized, the Senate 
Report on the 1996 amendments illustrates the broad scope that they were 
intended to reach.138  This conclusion is further bolstered by the Report’s 
declaration that the CFAA “facilitates addressing in a single statute the 
 
132 Id. at 14 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
133 Hernacki, supra note 111, at 1549. 
134 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984). 
135 Id. (emphasis added). 
136 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 
1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting Congress intended with the 1996 amendments to 
broaden the scope of the CFAA). 
137 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7 (1996) (emphasis added). 
138 See Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 
2009) (“[A] narrow reading of the CFAA ignores the consistent amendments that Congress 
has enacted to broaden its application.”); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 
(noting that the legislative history “demonstrates the broad meaning and intended scope” of 
the CFAA terms). 
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problem of computer crime, rather than identifying and amending every 
potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer 
technology.”139 
Finally, one section of the Report specifically counters the common 
retort that the CFAA should not cover computer theft of information 
because other laws exist to combat such theft: 
The proposed subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the interstate or 
foreign theft of information by computer. . . .   This subsection would ensure that the 
theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in 
the same way theft of physical items is protected.  In instances where the information 
stolen is also copyrighted, the theft may implicate certain rights under the copyright 
laws.  The crux of the offense under subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse 
of a computer to obtain the information.140 
Taken together, this legislative history makes clear that one of the 
CFAA’s central purposes is to protect against digital information theft.  
Indeed, while advocates of a narrow interpretation maintain that the statute 
is concerned only with access, not misuse, the statute’s history indicates 
that it was largely driven to combat the specific misuse and theft of 
information. 
Further, Congress has continually broadened the CFAA’s scope, 
expanding it to cover theft by private entities and by not only those outside 
the entity (such as hackers) but also by those within the entity (such as 
employees).141  In so doing, it identified the purpose as prohibiting 
information theft in the same way that tangible property theft is prohibited.  
Businesses are protected against employees thieving tangible property that 
they are permitted to use for work purposes.  Consequently, businesses 
should similarly be protected from the theft of information that employees 
are permitted to access for work purposes.  But even drawing such a parallel 
is not necessary.  In the Reports concerning the 1986 amendment that added 
the “exceeds authorized access” language at issue, Congress made explicit 
that the purpose of access is part of the inquiry.142 
 
139 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5. 
140 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7–8; see also Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 
1128 (declaring this language in the Senate Report to be “dispositive” evidence of the 
legislative intent behind the CFAA). 
141 Kerr, supra note 42, at 1662 (explaining that Congress’s addition of the “exceeding 
authorized access” prohibition was directed at misuse committed by insiders). 
142 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.  
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C. CFAA TEXT DEMONSTRATES THAT IT APPLIES TO INSIDER DIGITAL 
THEFT 
Beyond the policy concerns and legislative history, the idea that the 
term “exceeds authorized access” includes liability for insider theft is 
supported by the textual incoherence that otherwise results.  Proponents of 
the narrow interpretation contend that “exceeds authorized access” only 
applies to insiders when they employ their authorized use of a computer to 
access specific files they are not authorized to access, and that their use of 
that information is irrelevant.  This interpretation ignores the statutory 
definition, effectively rendering “exceeds authorized access” to mean: “to 
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to access or 
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled to access 
or alter.”  Such an interpretation cannot stand for three reasons. 
First, this is a statute entitled “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” not 
the “Computer Improper Access Act,” and the words “Fraud” and “Abuse” 
convey that it is concerned—indeed primarily concerned—with information 
use and not its mere access. 
Second, the definition of the term reads not just “obtain or alter” but 
“so to obtain or alter.”  The inclusion of the word “so” implies a concern 
with the manner in which data is obtained or altered and not simply with 
permission to access data.143  The narrow interpretation simply ignores the 
presence of that duly enacted word.144  This ignorance is no mere semantic 
detail; the prohibition on “altering” demonstrates that ignoring “so” could 
produce absurd results.  Take, for example, an employee who is authorized 
to access a spreadsheet only to input data and, in an act of sabotage, deletes 
the entire spreadsheet.  By virtue of her authorization to input data, that 
employee is entitled to “alter” the spreadsheet.  If we ignore the word “so,” 
we ignore the limited manner in which the employee is entitled to alter the 
data.  Thus, the narrow interpretation discarding of the word “so” means 
any minimal authorization to alter data gives carte blanche for all 
alterations, including sabotage and destruction. 
Third, it is contrary to the entire statute’s text to read “obtain” to mean 
“access.”  The CFAA as a whole uses the word “access,” or a derivative 
thereof, eighteen times—four times in the very definition at issue.145  If the 
 
143 See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 
(2012) (en banc). 
144 Id. at 785–86.  
145 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (using the word “access” or a derivative thereof twice in 
subsection (a)(1), twice in subsection (a)(2), twice in subsection (a)(3), twice in subsection 
(a)(4), once in subsection (a)(5)(B), once in subsection (a)(5)(C), once in subsection (a)(6), 
once in subsection (a)(7)(A), four times in subsection (e)(6), and twice in subsection 
(e)(10)). 
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drafters intended “obtain” to mean “access,” they would have simply used 
the word one more time. 
Fourth, the additional prohibition on altering information also serves to 
further elucidate the impropriety of conflating “obtain” with “access.”146  In 
order to alter information, one must access it first.  Thus, the narrow 
interpretation’s conflation of “obtain” with “access” renders the word 
“alter” redundant; if the initial access violates the statute, it does so 
regardless of what is done with that information.  For a theory whose merit 
lies in its “textual” approach, the narrow interpretation’s credibility is 
undermined by these inconsistencies. 
D. CURRENT BROAD LIABILITY THEORIES ARE ALSO FLAWED 
The narrow interpretation’s flaws do not mean, however, that its 
criticisms of the broad theories are unfounded.  Indeed, as currently applied, 
the theories supporting broad interpretation are themselves untenable. 
The law of agency as a means of determining employee liability is 
vague and malleable.147  For instance, it is uncertain how “adverse” an 
interest must be to result in a breach of loyalty that would lead to CFAA 
liability.148  Numerous other questions also remain.  For example, what 
about interests that may not be parallel to the employer’s but are not 
directly adverse?  What if an employee is retrieving information for his own 
personal purposes but is not using it to the detriment of the employer?  
Does accessing the Internet to waste time while on the clock violate the 
duty of loyalty and revoke an employee’s authorization?  Can loyalty be 
restored after it is breached?  Can permission to access information be 
restored after it is implicitly revoked?  Is it fair to give someone explicit 
permission to do something and then implicitly revoke that permission 
without express notice?  While the law of agency provides answers to these 
questions, the more salient point is—are employees (or employers) aware of 
those answers?  As one student note put it, “[b]road interpretations, 
including those that would find liability for . . . breaches of agency law 
 
146 See id. § 1030(e)(6). 
147 See Field, supra note 42, at 843. 
148 Id. at 844 (“A court could determine either that acquiring any adverse interest to his 
employer left him without authorization, or it could find that the employee’s actions did not 
constitute a serious enough breach of loyalty to find a termination of authorization.  Both 
outcomes are arguably allowable under section 112 [of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency] . . . .”). 
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duties, raise significant problems of overbreadth and vagueness 
necessitating a more narrowly-tailored approach.”149 
Contract theory also has the potential to lead to unfair and unintended 
CFAA prosecutions.  As the Nosal court pointed out: 
Minds have wandered since the beginning of time and the computer gives employees 
new ways to procrastinate, by g-chatting with friends, playing games, shopping or 
watching sports highlights.  Such activities are routinely prohibited by many 
computer-use policies . . . .  [U]nder the broad interpretation of the CFAA, such minor 
dalliances would become federal crimes.150 
Some may respond that such an argument is a mere technicality and rely on 
prosecutorial discretion to prevent such charges.  The Nosal court addressed 
that argument as well, stating, “[w]hile it’s unlikely that you'll be 
prosecuted for watching Reason.TV on your work computer, you could be.  
Employers wanting to rid themselves of troublesome employees without 
following proper procedures could threaten to report them to the FBI unless 
they quit.  Ubiquitous, seldom-prosecuted crimes invite arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”151  A federal circuit court adopting the current 
broad interpretations, then, could invite arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
Further, broad interpretation supported by contract theory could 
potentially lead to prosecutions for violating websites’ terms of service.152  
Given that the vast majority of online services have “clickable” terms of 
service agreements that are pages long and are rarely read, people may 
unwittingly expose themselves to criminal liability for innocuous actions 
that they have no idea are prohibited.153  The Nosal court cited one 
example: most social media websites have terms of service that prohibit 
lying.  But “[l]ying on social media websites is common: People shave 
years off their age, add inches to their height and drop pounds from their 
weight.”154  Such lies may seem innocuous, but “[t]he difference between 
puffery and prosecution may depend on whether you happen to be someone 
[a federal prosecutor] has reason to go after.”155 
 
149 Hernacki, supra note 111, at 1564 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 1568 
(criticizing the agency approach for interpreting “exceeds authorized access” in a way that 
implicates unconstitutional vagueness). 
150 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
151 Id. 
152 Kerr, supra note 42, at 1600 (explaining that “[a]n example [of a violation under 
contract theory] would be use that violates the Terms of Service that an ISP imposes on its 
customers”). 
153 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860–62. 
154 Id. at 862. 
155 Id. 
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These concerns are not hypothetical.  In United States v. Drew, Lori 
Drew was prosecuted under the CFAA on the theory that the fake profile 
she created violated MySpace’s terms of service.156  Drew created the fake 
profile to start an “insult” war to bully one of her seventh grade daughter’s 
classmates.157  Creation of the fake profile, according to the prosecution, 
violated the website’s terms of service and meant that Drew had “exceeded 
authorized access,” violating the CFAA.158  While Drew’s actions and 
motivations may have been despicable, Congress passed the CFAA to 
protect digital property rights, not prevent cyber-bullying.  If the theory is 
that the breach of terms of service creates the CFAA violation, then the 
breach of any terms of service agreement would lead to the same result, 
even those breaches much more innocuous than Drew’s.159 
V. THE “OBTAIN” THEORY 
The circuit split is focused on the merits of the narrow interpretation or 
the broad interpretations.160  But there lies another path.  It provides liability 
for insider theft, like the broad interpretations, while accounting for 
concerns of overbreadth that motivate use of the narrow interpretation.  This 
approach contends, unlike the narrow interpretation, that the CFAA does 
inherently contain restrictions on information use.  Unlike the current broad 
interpretations, this approach argues that the CFAA itself limits the scope of 
use restrictions.  Indeed, this Comment submits that the statute contains two 
specific use restrictions: the prohibitions on “altering” and “obtaining.”161  
 
156 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[A] central question 
[in the prosecution] is whether a computer user’s intentional violation of one or more 
provisions in an Internet website’s terms of services (where those terms condition access to 
and/or use of the website’s services upon agreement to and compliance with the terms) 
satisfies the first element of section 1030(a)(2)(C).”). 
157 See id. at 452; see also Nicholas R. Johnson, Note, “I Agree” to Criminal Liability: 
Lori Drew’s Prosecution Under § 1030(A)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and 
Why Every Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561, 561–65. 
158 See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 457. 
159 Drew was convicted on the CFAA charge, id. at 453, but the conviction was 
dismissed post-verdict by Central District of California Judge George H. Wu, who held that 
the conviction violated void-for-vagueness doctrine.  Id. at 467–68.  The important point, 
though, is that prosecutors operating under a contract theory could, and in fact did, bring 
CFAA charges against someone for creating a fake profile. 
160 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (“We remain unpersuaded by the decisions of our sister 
circuits that interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use 
restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty.” (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 
1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); and Int’l Airport 
Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006))).  
161 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012). 
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In fact, in patterns involving insider theft, the overlooked “obtain” 
restriction is key. 
The CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” to mean to “access a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter.”162  As argued earlier, the narrow interpretation effectively ignores the 
word “so” and equates “obtain” with “access.”163 
Consider again an employee who has permission to use a computer 
and permission to access a given file.  He e-mails the file to his personal e-
mail address for the purpose of launching competition with his employer.  
According to the narrow interpretation, no violation has occurred because 
the employee had permission to access and use the information for his 
employment.164  But the statute does not prohibit accessing information that 
the accesser is not entitled to access or alter.  It prohibits obtaining 
information the obtainer is not so entitled to obtain or alter. 
Instead of counterintuitively assigning “obtain” the meaning of 
“access,” courts should take the approach ostensibly favored by those who 
advocate the narrow approach—interpreting the statute based on the plain 
meaning of its words.  The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “obtain” as 
“to gain or get (something) usually by effort.”165  Black’s Law Dictionary 
does not define “obtain” but does define “acquire” as “to gain possession or 
control of; to get or obtain.”166  The Law Dictionary, meanwhile, defines 
“obtain” as “[t]o acquire; to get hold of by effort; to get and retain 
possession of.”167  All these definitions seem to imply a more permanent act 
than mere transitory access.  While an employee may very well be 
authorized to access information, the grant of access does not mean the 
employee is authorized to permanently acquire the information.  If 
prosecutors and courts give “obtain” its plain meaning, then an employee 
violates the statute once he uses authorized access to personally acquire or, 
 
162 Id. 
163 See supra Part III.C; see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858 (“If an employee circumvents 
the security measures, copies the information to a thumb drive and walks out of the building 
with it in his pocket, he would then have obtained access to information in the computer that 
he is not ‘entitled so to obtain.’”). 
164 See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]n employer gives an employee ‘authorization’ to access a company computer when the 
employer gives the employee permission to use it.”). 
165 Obtain, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://goo.gl/aA2YJA (last visited 
June 2, 2014). 
166 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 26 (9th ed. 2009). 
167 Obtain, THE LAW DICTIONARY FEATURING BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY FREE ONLINE 
LEGAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.), http://goo.gl/wD9s1o. 
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“gain control of,” information he is not “so entitled” to “acquire or, gain 
control of.” 
This interpretation is consistent with the statute’s intent to create laws 
analogous to theft and trespass that can be applied to the digital world.  For 
instance, an employee may be entitled to use a piece of a company’s 
physical property, and even to take that property home with her, but that 
does not permit her to permanently acquire it.  The distinction between this 
scenario and digital theft is that a true owner is not deprived of the 
electronic files.168 
That distinction is precisely why traditional property laws failed in 
their application to digital information and precisely the reason for which 
specialized computer abuse laws were enacted.169  Giving plain meaning to 
the term “obtain,” a court should interpret the statute to bar digital 
information theft by defining the CFAA from the perspective of the 
violator, acquiring something he is not entitled to acquire, as opposed to the 
true owner, losing a property interest.  It would thus not only be consistent 
with goals articulated in the specific legislative history of the CFAA but 
with the key motivation for computer misuse statutes in general. 
Further, this plain language definition of “obtain” resolves the textual 
incoherency in the narrow interpretation.  As previously discussed, the 
narrow approach conflates the meaning of “obtain” with “access,” even 
though the drafters used the word “access” throughout the statute when they 
intended that meaning.  Also, interpreting “obtain” to mean “access” makes 
the inclusion of “alter” redundant.  If “obtain” had its plain meaning—
“acquisition”—there were would be no redundancy; rather, the statute 
would prohibit two separate, specific uses of information: misappropriation 
and unauthorized alteration.  This interpretation is consistent with the plain 
language definition, the language chosen throughout the statute, and the 
purpose of computer misuse legislation.  Moreover, it leads to results 
consistent with the intent of the legislature. 
By recognizing some liability for misuse, this interpretation gives 
meaning to the word “so” in “so entitled.”  It imposes liability on the 
employee who, while authorized to alter a database to input information, 
sabotages and destroys the database.  Now, under the “obtain” theory, the 
scope of “so entitled” still must be defined.  Here, the principles of the 
contract and agency theories are useful but with an important limitation: not 
every violation of contract or agency amounts to a CFAA violation; rather, 
only those actions that can be construed as “acquiring” or “altering” 
information constitute violations.  Gone are the murkier grounds of minor 
 
168 See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1611. 
169 See supra Part I.B. 
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violations of computer-use policies (such as personal web surfing) or terms 
of service. 
Still unresolved is the criticism that the contract and agency theories 
import principles extrinsic to the statute’s text.170  Ultimately, though, this 
criticism falls flat.  Congress chose the phrase “so entitled” without further 
definition.  As the narrow interpretation argues, words should take their 
common meaning, and law regarding contract and agency does indeed 
commonly define the scope of what employees are allowed to do.  Where 
authorization is explicit, such as in an employment contract, the explicitly 
defined scope should govern. 
Oftentimes, employees’ authorization to act is not explicit but implicit.  
In the employment context, however, the law of agency is the very thing 
that defines the scope of implicit authorization.  Congress knew that and 
chose not to provide any contrary definition.  Without the bounds of agency 
law, any implicit authorization to access information becomes a blanket 
authorization of access and use.  Further, in the context of implicit 
authorization, it is the potential violator who is asking the court to infer the 
existence of authorization.  Since it is to the violator’s benefit to make the 
inference that authorization exists at all, it is only fair to also allow an 
inference as to the scope of that authorization. 
The important distinction is that while the “obtain” interpretation 
theory may still incorporate extrinsic bodies of law, it limits the influence of 
that extrinsic law based on the words of the CFAA itself.  The CFAA would 
not be violated every time people exceed the access authorized by their 
employment contracts or agency relationships.  Rather, insiders would only 
violate the CFAA by obtaining or altering information that their agency or 
contracts did not so entitle them to obtain or alter. 
Of course, because of the nature of digital information, it is hard to 
define when information is being merely accessed as opposed to obtained.  
Nevertheless, using the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word 
“acquire,” it becomes fair to say that information is “obtained” when the 
user maintains “control over” the information or the ability to access the 
information even after authorization has expired.171  For instance, when an 
employee e-mails proprietary information to a personal e-mail address, he 
creates a way of accessing the information independent of the access 
granted by the information owner.  This definition is consistent with the 
 
170 See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(arguing that “[n]othing in the CFAA suggests that a defendant’s liability for accessing a 
computer without authorization turns on whether the defendant breached a state law duty of 
loyalty to an employer”). 
171 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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point raised above that, in terms of digital misappropriation, theft is defined 
not as the loss of property interest by the true owner, but the illegitimate 
gain of such an interest by the acquirer. 
This definition raises a potential question in regards to a common 
factual situation: what happens when an employee transmits information to 
a personal e-mail or computer for the purpose of working from home, but 
later uses that information for other purposes?  The answer, again, lies in 
the definition of “exceeds authorized access.”  The prohibition is not merely 
on “obtaining information” but “obtaining or altering information that the 
accesser is not entitled to so obtain or alter.”172  The use of “so” indicates 
that the entitlement to obtain or alter can be conditioned.173  If the employer 
has imposed no restraint on the information, no violation has occurred.  If, 
however, the employer has made clear that it is the owner of property, and 
that any “control over” information is allowed only for the purposes of 
working from home, then the employee is not entitled to control it for other 
purposes.  When the employee pursues other purposes, he asserts control 
over information in a way that he is not entitled to and thus violates the 
CFAA. 
A potential criticism of the “obtain theory” is that the misappropriation 
of information may already be actionable.  As Aleynikov illustrates, though, 
a federal cause of action is not always available.174  Further, the information 
that is worth protecting because of privacy concerns may not reach the level 
of trade secrets protected by state law.175  Even if other actions were 
available, Congress addressed in debate over the CFAA the potential of 
duplicative liability.176  Such concerns were dismissed, though, as the 
statute was passed with the congressional reports noting that while the theft 
may implicate other rights, under the CFAA “the crux of the offense . . . is 
the abuse of a computer to obtain the information.”177 
 
172 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012) (emphasis added). 
173 See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 
(2012) (en banc). 
174 See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2012). 
175 See generally Personal Data Threat to Millions As Company Hacking Reaches New 
High, KPMG (Nov. 12, 2012), http://goo.gl/hHAOFm. 
176 See Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured 
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 458–59 (1990) (“Witnesses at 
committee hearings on the need for a federal computer crime statute testified that . . . 
existing federal statutes could be used to prosecute computer assisted crimes [before the 
CFAA was passed].”). 
177 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7–8 (1996). 
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CONCLUSION 
The CFAA is designed to update property protections for the changing 
conditions of the modern world.  Traditional laws of trespass, burglary, and 
larceny were not sufficient to address issues of computer misuse.  
Traditional trespass and burglary laws require a physical invasion that 
simply does not occur in the world of digital trespass.  Theft laws, too, are 
insufficient due to their reliance on the victim’s loss of a property right.  
When digital information is stolen, it is almost always copied and extracted, 
leaving the original owner with the same information as before the theft. 
Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and its 
amendments to directly combat the insufficiencies of existing law.  
Together, they were meant to protect computer owners from threats ranging 
from hacking, to denial-of-service attacks, to destructive worms or viruses, 
to information theft.  Indeed, information theft is directly mentioned 
multiple times in the legislative history of both the original 1984 CFAA and 
its subsequent amendments.  Further, Congress drew an explicit distinction 
in that the Act’s legislative history between theft that occurs by outsiders, 
hacking into systems, and theft that occurs by insiders, abusing their 
privileges to access information.178 
It is not only good policy to combat both sorts of misconduct—insider 
and outsider theft—the CFAA legislative history indicates that combating 
such misconduct was the intent of the statute.  That intent is manifest in the 
alternative prohibitions on accessing computers “without authorization” or 
“in excess” of authorization.”  However, circuit courts have split into two 
broad camps regarding the exact nature of insider misconduct prohibited by 
the statute.  The narrow interpretation camp maintains that the prohibition 
only refers to information within a system that an insider does not have 
explicit authorization to access.  To those in the narrow camp, “exceeding 
authorized access” only occurs when an insider is allowed to access a 
computer, but hacks into files to which authorization does not extend.  The 
broad interpretation camps maintain that exceeding authorized access refers 
not just to the situations discussed above, but also to situations in which an 
employee accesses information that she is authorized to access but does so 
for purposes that violate her authorization. 
 The broad interpretation contains two subsets: agency theory and 
contract theory.  Agency theory maintains that when an agent acts upon 
interests adverse to her principal, the authorization associated with the 
principal–agent relationship is revoked.  Contract theory maintains that the 
scope of employees’ authorization can be, and is, limited by the defined 
 
178 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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prohibitions in their contracts.  If employees access information in violation 
of those contract provisions, their access is unauthorized and violates the 
CFAA. 
The narrow and broad interpretations each have their advantages.  The 
narrow interpretation creates a bright-line rule to easily identify prohibited 
conduct, and relies on the text of the statute, rather than any extrinsic law, 
for its basis.  The broad interpretation and both of its supporting theories 
seem to better cover the spirit of the law, but extend liability beyond 
improper access to misuse (or abuse) of information.  These theories extend 
liability to insider theft of information that employees have permission to 
access, which reaches a result seemingly consistent with the legislative 
history and intent. 
All three of these approaches also have drawbacks.  The narrow theory 
does not extend to situations that the CFAA is intended to cover.  Under 
that theory, as long as an accesser has permission to access a specific piece 
of information, no action taken with that information violates the CFAA.  In 
contrast, the broad theories both have little grounding in statutory text and 
are potentially dangerous due to their abilities to be overly broad. 
A novel approach, however, is consistent with the text of the statute, 
extending liability to insider theft without posing the potential of overbroad 
prosecution.  Without utilizing extrinsic principles, the very text of the 
statute identifies two specific improper uses—“obtaining” or “altering” 
information in a way that is not entitled.  If the term “obtain” were given its 
plain meaning of “acquisition,” then the CFAA by its terms would indeed 
extend criminal liability for insider theft.  This approach is consistent with 
the purposes of computer misuse statutes as it resolves the difficulties 
relating to victims’ lost property interests.  Instead of focusing on the 
owner’s deprived property interest, it focuses on the thief, who acquires 
something to which he is not entitled. 
Not only is this interpretation consistent with the policy goals behind 
computer misuse statutes.  It is also consistent with the specific legislative 
history of the CFAA.  That history identifies theft and insider theft as a 
concern with which the Act is addressed.  Like the broader theories, the 
“obtain” theory extends coverage to such conduct.  Unlike those theories, 
however, it does not pose the potential of overbroad applications because it 
specifically limits liability to the two enumerated misuses: unentitled 
“altering” and “obtaining.” 
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